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RESISTING "UTMOST RESISTANCE": 
USING RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME TO 
COMBAT UNDERLYING RAPE MYTHS 
INFLUENCING ACQUAINTANCE 
RAPE TRIALS 
KARA M. DELTuFO* 
REPRESENTING RAPE: LANGUAGE AND SEXUAL CONSENT. By 
Susan Ehrlich. London and New York: Routledge 2001. Pp. 174. 
Abstract: Susan Ehrlich's book examines the linguistic practices of 
acquaintance rape trials. She contends that the proceedings are framed 
by the ideology of the "utmost resistance standard." This ideology, as 
represented in the language of a rape trial, tries to reconstruct strategic 
acts into consensual sex. Ehrlich suggests that by viewing the events and 
the participants in a rape trial through an alternate ideology-one 
informed by the cultural knowledge of women's social and physical 
vulnerability to sexual violence-alternative forms of agency and 
notions of gender can be understood. This Book Review examines the 
role of rape myths in acquaintance rape trials and explores how Rape 
Trauma Syndrome can foster alternative ideologies in the courtroom. 
In her book, Representing &pe: Language and Sexual Consent, Susan 
Ehrlich analyzes the language of a rape trial to show how culturally 
dominant notions about violence against women penetrate and circu-
late within the rhetoric of sexual assault adjudication processes.1 Ehr-
lich examines both a Canadian university'S tribunal trial and a Cana-
dian criminal law trial of the same male student accused of two 
separate instances of sexual assault.2 She asserts that ideologies em-
bedded in the questioning of adjudicators and lawyers serve to shape 
rape trials in such a way that the outcome of a trial is prescribed by 
these ideologies.3 Ehrlich further contends that her analysis departs 
* Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL (2001-2002). 
1 SUSAN EHRLICH, REPRESENTING RAPE: LANGUAGE AND SEXUAL CONSENT 2 (2001). 
2 See id. at 31-32. 
5 See id. at 91-92. 
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from previous linguistic scholarship on rape trials because she as-
cribes a largely constitutive role to language.4 
Ehrlich found that the trials she examined did not allow the 
complainants' version of events and points of view to emerge.5 She 
found this to be a consequence of the "utmost resistance standard."6 
Ehrlich examines how this standard, which focuses on the women's 
degree of resistance, is the primary ideological frame through which 
rape is understood.7 In her conclusion, she proposes to consider "how 
different questions with different presuppositions might structure ac-
quaintance rape adjudication processes."8 Ehrlich proposes a "reason-
able woman" standard, suggesting that, if viewed with the cultural 
knowledge of women's social and physical vulnerability to sexual vio-
lence, complainants' inaction and deficient signals of consent can be 
recontextualized as strategic acts of resistance and not as consensual 
sex.9 
Ehrlich alludes to the way that this type of cultural knowledge 
could inform the dominant discourses in the talk of sexual assault ad-
judication procedures.10 She notes that male judges who have been 
educated about women's distinctive experiences are less likely to as-
sume that they can simply look to how they themselves might be af-
fected by an action to decide whether it is part of a pattern of sexual 
harassment.ll However, outside of the education of judges, who com-
prise only one type of participant in a criminal trial, Ehrlich does not 
propose any concrete ways to transform the utmost resistance stan-
dard ideology that pervades a rape trial's proceedings and outcomes. 
This Book Review expands upon Ehrlich's analysis of the ideo-
logical frame of utmost resistance informing rape trials and explores 
how the use of Rape Trauma Syndrome testimony can provide an al-
ternative ideological frame through which to understand acquain-
tance rape. Part I describes the cases Ehrlich studied and provides 
4 See id. at 1. Ehrlich explains that by "constitutive" she means the way in which lan-
guage can define and delimit the meanings attached to events and subjects. See id. 
S See EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 151-52. 
6 See id. at 65-67. 
7 See id. 
S See id. at 135. 
9 See id. at 144. 
10 See EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 146. 
11 See id. Ehrlich quotes a discussion of legal scholar Kathryn Abrams' conclusions. See 
id. (quoting S. McConnell-Ginet, Can linguists help identify sexual harassment? Paper 
Presented to the Linguistic Society of America Symposium: Linguistic Perspectives on Sex-
ual Harassment at the Linguistic Society of America's Annual Meeting 4 (Jan. 1995». 
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some background into the "utmost resistance standard." Part II will 
explore the way that rape myths inform acquaintance rape trials. Part 
III suggests that the ideological frame of utmost resistance remains so 
pervasive in part because recent rape law reforms have failed to ad-
dress the underlying ideologies shaping acquaintance rape trials. Fi-
nally, Part IV explores utilizing Rape Trauma Syndrome to combat the 
ideological frame of utmost resistance. This Book Review argues that 
the education provided by courtroom testimony on Rape Trauma 
Syndrome can dispel rape myths to which adjudicators are often pre-
disposed. In this way, Rape Trauma Syndrome testimony can over-
come some of the gender bias that currently taints the outcomes of 
acquaintance rape trials. 
I. THE CASE STUDY AND EHRLICH'S IDEOLOGICAL FRAME 
OF UTMOST RESISTANCE 
The accused and the complainants (whom Ehrlich has assigned 
the pseudonyms Matt, Connie, and Marg) were all white undergradu-
ate students at York University in Toronto, Canada.I2 In both cases, 
the facts were not at issue; what was at issue was whether or not the 
sexual acts were consensuaI.l3 Both sexual assault allegations arose out 
of cases of acquaintance or "simple rape. "14 
The separate incidents between Matt and Connie and Matt and 
Marg occurred within three days of one another.I5 Connie had invited 
Matt back to her dormitory room after he had taken her to dinner. I6 
12 See id. at 32. The race of the complainants and the accused is mentioned to recog-
nize that the legal system's demonization of men of color in attacks against white women 
did not enter into these cases. See id. (citing CATHERINE MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UN-
MODIFIED (1987»; Sharon Marcus, Fighting bodies, fighting words: A theory and politics of rape 
prevention, in FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE POUTICAL 385-403 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott 
eds., 1992); see also Toni M. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape 
Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REv. 
395, 407-08 (1985). Massaro notes that "[b]lack defendants typically receive harsher 
treatment than white defendants ... whereas both black and white defendants receive 
more lenient treatment when the victim is black." 
U See EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 32, 33. 
14 See id. at 32. Ehrlich relies on Susan Estrich's terms "real rape" and "simple rape" to 
differentiate between rapes that are perpetrated by armed strangers as opposed to rapes 
that might meet the statutory definition of rape, but are not considered rape by police, 
prosecutors, judges, and juries. See id. at 19 (discussing SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 4-7 
(1987». Examples of common types of "simple" rape include when a woman is forced to 
engage in sex with a date, an acquaintance, her boss, or a man she met at a bar; when no 
weapon is involved; and there is no overt evidence of physical injury. See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 32. 
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Mter Matt briefly massaged Connie and some consensual kissing oc-
curred, Connie objected to his further advancesP However, despite 
her objections, Connie testified that Matt persisted in sexually assault-
ing her. IS 
Similarly, Marg invited Matt back to her dormitory room, along 
with her friend Melinda and Melinda's boyfriend Bob.19 Matt had 
helped Marg locate her towed car, and the four of them had decided 
to pick up the car in the morning.2o Matt also gave Marg a massage, 
and she allowed him to sleep in her bed after warning him not to 
cross the line.21 Marg testified that once in her bed, Matt initiated a 
number of unwanted sexual advances.22 Despite Marg's attempts to 
alert Melinda and Bob to obtain their help, Matt persisted.23 
Estrich's work argues that cases of simple rape, such as Connie's 
and Marg's, are not often considered rape by police, prosecutors, 
judges, and juries while cases of real rape, which are much less com-
mon, are treated more aggressively.24 Applying this argument to a 
critical discourse analysis, Ehrlich asserts that the discourses sur-
rounding the prosecution of real rape versus simple rape cases in the 
criminal justice system "bring into being definitions and categories of 
what constitutes a legitimate or believable victim and a legitimate 
17 See id. 
18 See id. In accordance with the Criminal Code of Canada, the term sexual assault is 
used to refer to the type of acts allegedly committed by Matt. See id. at 22, 32. Connie al-
leged that Matt removed her clothes, penetrated her vagina with his finger, put his penis 
between her legs and rubbed it against her, and forced her to perform fellatio on him 
until orgasm. See id. at 34. In Canada, criminal laws governing acts of sexual aggression 
were revised in 1983, 1985, 1992, and 1995. See id. at 22. One crucial change involved re-
placing offenses of rape and indecent assault with the more general offense of sexual as-
sault. See id. at 22. Ehrlich notes that this change attempted "to include under its IUbric 
acts of sexual aggression that did not involve penetration." Id. at 25. While the case Ehrlich 
studies does not involve traditional common-law rape ("carnal knowledge of a woman, not 
one's wife, by force and against her will [which] included only penile-vaginal penetra-
tion"), most states in the United States have redefined penetration to include "sexual in-
tercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, and intercourse, or any intrusion, however slight, of any 
part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal opening of another per-
son's body." See CASSIA SPOHN &JUUE HORNEY, RAPE LAw REFORM: A GRASSROOTS REvo-
LUTION AND ITS IMPACT 21-22 (1992). 
19 See EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 34. 
20 See id. at 33. 
21 See id. 
22 See ill. Matt went under Marg's clothes and touched her breasts and vagina as well as 
put his foot between her legs and inserted his toe into her vagina, unbuttoned her shirt, 
sucked on her breasts, and put his fingers in her vagina. See id. 
23 See id. at 34. 
24 See EHRUCH, supra note 1, at 19. See generally ESTRICH, supra note 14, at 4-7; Susan 
Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE LJ. 1087,1092 (1986). 
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perpetrator."25 "Legitimate" perpetrators are strangers to their victim, 
carry a weapon, and inflict physical injury on their victim beyond the 
sexual violence; "legitimate" or believable victims are simply women 
raped by these "legitimate" perpetrators.26 
Ehrlich contends that the ideological frame of the utmost resis-
tance standard dominates courtroom talk in a way that imposes trial 
participants' ideas of legitimacy on rape victims.27 This ideological 
frame renders non-consent tantamount to consent, when non-consent 
does not take common and recognizable forms.28 Common law re-
quired women to resist a sexual attack to the utmost to prove rape.29 
In the United States, prior to the 1950s and 1960s, most statutes mir-
rored this common law requirement, focusing on the conduct of the 
victim rather than the perpetrator; whether a rape had occurred was 
dependent upon the victim's conduct.30 Informing the reasoning be-
25 See EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 20. Ehrlich describes her approach as a critical dis-
course analysis which is similar to 
feminist linguistic studies, particularly the type that unpacks and deconstructs 
the sexist and androcentric assumptions encoded in linguistic representa-
tions, work in critical discourse analysis does not merely describe language in 
a dispassionate and disinterested way ... proponents of critical discourse 
analysis assume that dominant social structures and processes are partly dis-
cursive in their nature and aim to expose how such discursive practices con-
tribute to the production and reproduction of unequal social relations. 
[d. at 35. 
26 See id. at 20. 
27 See id. at 67, 91-93. 
28 See EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 121. 
29 See Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. Ill.. L. REv. 953, 
957 (1998). Anderson describes the utmost resistance requirement as having 
two elements: (1) a woman must have struggled to the utmost of her physical 
capacity and (2) her resistance must not have subsided until after penetration 
... if a woman did not resist the rape to the utmost of her physical capacity, 
she was not raped. If a woman struggled to the utmost of her physical capacity 
until doing so appeared futile to her, and only then acquiesced to the rapist's 
advances, she also was not raped. 
[d. at 963. 
M See EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 65. Estrich also discusses this focus on the role of the 
victim, stating that: 
[In defining the crime, courts] have focused almost incidentally on the de-
fendant-and almost entirely on the victim '" [m] ens rea, where it might 
matter, is all but eliminated; prohibited force tends to be defined according 
to the response of the victim; and nonconsent-the sine qua non of the of-
fense-turns entirely on the victim's response. 
Estrich, supra note 24, at 1094. 
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hind the utmost resistance standard was the myth that women fabri-
cate accusations ofrape.31 By requiring a woman prove she resisted to 
the utmost, courts were able to make sure that a woman alleging rape 
was truly an unwilling party.32 
The utmost resistance standard was generally replaced by a "rea-
sonable resistance" standard in the 1950s and 1960s.33 However, Ehr-
lich contends that the utmost resistance standard nevertheless re-
mains the primary ideological frame through which the events in 
question and the complainants' actions are understood and evalu-
ated.34 The ideological frame of utmost resistance discounts the para-
lyzing nature of women's fear and therefore reconstructs the events in 
question as consensual sex.35 It presupposes that women have choice 
and options when confronted with the threat of sexual aggression and 
that women are unconstrained in their choice of appropriate avenues 
of resistance.36 Therefore women who do not pursue these (presup-
posed) readily available and numerous options by definition are not 
resisting to the utmost. 37 
Ehrlich examines the language of participants in Matt's tribunal 
hearing and his criminal trial to show exactly how this ideological 
frame functions in adjudicatory processes.38 For example, through the 
question-answer sequence of trial discourse, the defense is able to 
present complainants as ineffectual agents who consented to sex by 
failing to resist.39 Ehrlich explains that questions in a question-answer 
sequence shape and constrain the following answer.40 Thus, questions 
in acquaintance rape trials that put forth the defense's understanding 
of the events in question as consensual sex, shape the complainant's 
answer.41 Ehrlich demonstrates this in an excerpt from the trial in 
which the defense asks (in response to Connie's attempts to get Matt 
to leave her room), "And the best you could come up with I suggest is, 
'I've got a class in the morning, you better leave'?"42 To which Connie 
31 See EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 65. 
32 See id. at 66. 
33 See id. (citing ESTRlCH, supra note 14, at 37). 
34 See id. at 66-67. 
35 See id. at 91. 
36 See EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 91. 
37 See id. at 91-92. 
38 See id. at 31,62-93. 
39 See id. at 75-76. 
40 See id. at 31. 
41 See EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 31,75-76. 
42 See id. at 107. 
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replies, "At the time it was the best I could come up with. "43 This line 
of questioning serves to transform Connie's strategic act of resistance 
(trying to get Matt to leave the room without angering him) into an 
ineffectual act of resistance that, under the dominant discourse of 
utmost resistance, is reframed as consent.44 
Further, Ehrlich contends that the ideological frame of utmost 
resistance functions as a discursive constraint, restricting the com-
plain~nts' talk about their experiences so that the complainants pres-
ent themselves as ineffectual agents.45 Ehrlich explains that the de-
fense's questioning transforms Connie's initial rebuttal of the 
defense's assertion into an utterance where Connie echoes the de-
fense's characterization of her verbal behavior.46 
These types of exchanges in acquaintance rape trials serve to re-
inforce myths about rape.47 Because a questioner can control and 
characterize the flow of testimony, a questioner'S implicit suggestions 
that a complainant did not sufficiently resist the rape, and therefore 
consented, structure and constrain the complainant'S answer.48 Thus, 
these exchanges transform a complainant's strategic response to a 
sexual assault into a passive response, or worse, a consensual re-
sponse.49 In this way, trial discourse generates ideologies or rape 
myths, which jurors use to interpret the rape incident.50 Particularly, 
jurors rely on these ideologies to interpret the interaction between 
the victim and defendant (as rape or consensual act) and attribute 
blame.51 
II. GENDER STEREOTYPES IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM: RAPE MYTHS 
INFORMING RAPE TRIALS 
Sexism, in the form of rape myths, impedes the successful prose-
cution of rape.52 It affects all participants in rape trials and has yet to 
43 See id. 
44 Seeid. at 107, 119. 
45 See id. at 95. 
46 See EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 107. 
47 See id. at 63. 
48 See id. at 62-63, 67. 
49 See id. 
50 See GREGORY M. MATOESIAN, REPRODUCING RAPE: DOMINATION THROUGH TALK IN 
THE COURTROOM 22 (1993). 
51 See id. 
52 SeeMorrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in 
Rape Prosecutions, 24 V.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1013, 1014-15 (1991). 
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be truly remedied.53 In fact, in 2001 the American Bar Association's 
Commission on Women in the Profession found that one of the most 
commonly cited problems in the justice system was the devaluation of 
credibility and injuries as well as stereotypical assumptions about gen-
der.54 In particular, the Commission found these problems to affect 
the perceptions of participants in trials.55 
A. &pe Myths and the Ideological Frame of Utmost Resistance 
In cases of acquaintance rape, it is precisely these problems of 
devaluation of credibility and stereotypes about gender that shape the 
outcome of trials.56 As one scholar of rape trials has stated, '1urors 
possess a stultifying penchant for entertaining traditional stereotypes 
about the nature of male/female sexual relations and for incorporat-
ing this inaccurate extra legal evidence in their deliberations. "57 
These traditional stereotypes about gender are commonly referred to 
in rape scholarship as myths.58 One of the problems impeding fair 
53 See DEBORAH L. RHODE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN 
THE PROFESSION, THE UNFINISHED AGENDA: WOMEN AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 8 (2001), 
http://www.abanet.org/women/home.html; Kenneth Winchester Gaines, Rape Trauma 
Syndrome: Toward Proper Use in the Criminal Trial Context, 20 AM. J. 'TRIAL ADvoc. 227, 230-31 
(1997); Massaro, supra note 12, at 404-{)5. 
54 See RHODE, supra note 53, at 8. The American Bar Association's Commission on 
Women in the Profession published a report that provided a comprehensive, contempo-
rary review of the status of women in the American legal profession and justice system. See 
id. at 5. 
55 See id. 
56 See id. at 21-22. See generally ANDREW E. TASLlTZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE 
COURTROOM (1999) (discussing how cultural narratives about gender and sexual violence 
shape trial outcomes); Torrey, supra note 52 (discussing how the law's willingness to toler-
ate myths about rape impedes the successful prosecution of rape). 
57 See Gregory M. Matoesian, Language, Law, and Society: Policy Implications of the Kennedy 
Smith Rape Trial, 29 LAw & SOC'y REv. 669, 670 (1995). 
56 See, e.g., EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 29; Torrey, supra note 52, at 1014-15. The term 
"myths" in this Book Review refers to fictions that inform society's misunderstandings of 
rape. See, e.g., EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 29; Torrey, supra note 52, at 1014-15. Yet, it is im-
portant to note that many scholars of rape and rape trials have developed their own terms 
to refer to these fictions. See, e.g., EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 29; Torrey, supra note 52, at 
1014-15. Ehrlich and Torrey both use the term "myth." See EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 29; 
Torrey, supra note 52, at 1014-15. However, Andrew Taslitz uses the term "cultural rape 
narratives" to refer to "culturally pervasive tales of proper intergender sexual behavior." 
TASLITZ, supra note 56, at 19. Gregory Matoesian uses the term "patriarchal ideology" to 
refer to "ideas about sexual access and practice." MATOESIAN, supra note 50, at 2. In later 
scholarship, Matoesian uses the term "patriarchal logic of sexual rationality" to refer to 
"arbitrary male standards--the all-or-nothing, impersonal, and penetration-oriented nor-
mative preferences of sexuality-governing the interpretation of sexual desire, sexual ac-
cess and sexual interaction as these creatively unfold through the production of trial talk." 
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outcomes in acquaintance rape trials is the prevalence of myths about 
rape that thrive in society.59 Rape myths encompass stereotypes of who 
is a rapist and who is a victim.GO Particularly in acquaintance rape tri-
als, rape myths often include beliefs about the way victims should act 
before, during, and after a rape.61 Included among familiar acquain-
tance rape myths: 
[W]omen mean "yes" when they say "no"; women are "asking 
for it" when they wear provocative clothes, go to bars alone 
or simply walk down the street at night; only virgins can be 
raped; women are vengeful, bitter creatures "out to get 
men"; if a woman says ''yes" once, there is no reason to be-
lieve her "no" the next time; women who "tease" men de-
serve to be raped; the mcyority of women who are raped are 
promiscuous or have bad reputations; a woman who goes to 
the home of a man on the first date implies she is willing to 
have sex; women cry rape to cover up an illegitimate preg-
nancy; a man is justified in forcing sex on a woman who 
makes him sexually excited; a man is entitled to sex if he 
buys a woman dinner; women derive pleasure from victimi-
zation.62 
The belief that women, motivated by revenge, blackmail, jealousy, 
guilt, or embarrassment, falsely claim rape after consenting to sexual 
relations is one of the most adhered to and consequently potent rape 
myths.63 
The ideological frame of utmost resistance is based upon the 
rape myth that women fabricate accusations ofrape.64 Research shows 
that the false rape charge myth supports the belief that a woman's de-
gree of resistance should be a major factor in determining if a rape 
has occurred. In accordance with this focus on a woman's resistance is 
the notion that it should be difficult for a woman to prove that a rape 
Matoesian, supra note 57, at 682. For the purposes of this Book Review the term "myths" is 
used broadly and encompasses all of these authors' scholarship regarding their respective 
terms. 
59 SeeTorrey, supra note 52, at 1014-15. 
00 See id. 
61 See id. at 1015. 
62 See id. 
6S See id. at 1025. 
64 See EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 65-66. 
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has taken place because they frequently allege false rapes.65 This basic 
premise, that a woman's degree of resistance should determine if a 
rape has occurred, informs Ehrlich's ideological frame of utmost re-
sistance.66 It is also one that the common law traditionally relied 
upon, as evidenced by many courts' requirements that the prosecu-
tion prove the victim resisted, made a prompt complaint, and did not 
consent. 67 
B. How Rape Myths Influence Judges and Juries 
Although overwhelmingly proven false by data, rape myths are 
primarily effective because they rely upon conventional and patriar-
chal notions of gender to shape the way judges and juries perceive 
testimony in rape trials.68 Because jurors tend to bring with them fun-
damental premises with which to interpret facts and attribute blame, 
rape myths have an extremely powerful influence over jurors. 69 
Because an instance of acquaintance rape rarely involves more 
than one defendant and one rape survivor, and little corroborative 
evidence, criminal proceedings often come down to the believability 
of either party's story. 70 Jurors view the events in question, and there-
fore determine the outcome of the trial, through the framework of 
their own beliefs, values, prejudices, and bias.71 Because jurors uncon-
sciously need to maintain coherency, when confronted with gaps in 
the evidence (such as the he-said/she-said or consent/rape dispute), 
they fill in these gaps with familiar rape myths.72 When jurors evaluate 
65 See Torrey, supra note 52, at 1039. Torrey cites a 1977 study conducted by Nona J. 
Barnett and Hubert S. Feild which used an Attitudes Toward Rape Questionnaire that 
asked respondents to rate their degree of agreement or disagreement with statements 
respecting rape myths. See id. at 1039 n.119. 
66 EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 67. 
67 See Torrey, supra note 52, at 1041. 
66 See id. at 1015, 1017-18. Torrey cites a 1980 study by Martha Burt that found many 
Americans believe rape myths and that American rape attitudes are strongly connected to 
other deeply held and pervasive attitudes such as sex-role stereotyping, distrust of the op-
posite sex (adversarial sex beliefs), and acceptance of interpersonal violence. See id. at 
1017-18. Torrey also cites a 1985 study by James Check and Neil Malamuth that confirmed 
the connection between acceptance of rape myths, rape, and callous, unbelieving attitudes 
towards rape victims. See id. at 10 19. 
69 See id. at 1050. Torrey relies on Donald E. Vinson's (a psychologist with Litigation 
Sciences) application of social science theories and techniques to more than 700 cases. See 
Torrey, supra note 52, at 1050 n.179. 
70 David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape In The Criminaljustice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1322 (1997). 
71 See Torrey, supra note 52, at 1050. 
72 See TASLITZ, supra note 56, at 7-8. 
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the evidence in order to attribute blame and assign responsibility, they 
rely upon familiar rape myths as interpretative resources for assessing 
and understanding action.73 
In addition to jurors' natural tendencies to utilize rape myths, 
these myths are reinforced into the minds of jurors and adjudicators 
by defense attorneys' questions.74 Defense attorneys capitalize on ju-
rors' reliance on false rape myths.75 By using language to highlight 
ways the complainant's testimony is inconsistent with myths prescrib-
ing how a rape victim should act, the defense creates doubt as to the 
veracity of the victim's story. 76 The William Kennedy Smith trial pro-
vides a well-known example of defense counsel relying upon familiar 
rape myths to discredit the complainant's testimony.77 In that trial, the 
defense devoted a substantial amount of time cross-examining a wit-
ness about the search for the complainant's shoe following the rape.78 
By asking about the details surrounding the search for the shoe, the 
defense contrasted the triviality of an article of dress like a shoe, with 
the seriousness of an alleged rape; thus creating doubt as to the verac-
ity of the victim's claim of rape.79 The complainant's story seemed 
false when informed by the myth that real victims of rape immediately 
report the crime to the police.80 
III. THE WEAKNESS OF RAPE LAw REFORM 
The roles that rape myths played in the William Kennedy Smith 
trial demonstrate a crucial weakness of rape law reform.81 Despite 
substantial reforms in rape law prior to the trial, defense counsel was 
still able to exploit jurors' reliance on familiar rape myths.82 Rape law 
reform first gained momentum in the early 1970s, when the problem 
of rape prompted a powerful social movement focused on making 
73 SeeMATOESIAN, supra note 50, at 102. 
74 See EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 91; MATOESIAN, supra note 50, at 125; TASUTZ, supra 
note 56, at 23-25. 
75 SeeEHRLICH, supra note 1, at 91; Matoesian, supra note 57, at 681,682-83. 
76 See EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 91; Matoesian, supra note 57, at 681,687. 
77 See TASUTZ, supra note 56, at 84, 90; Matoesian, supra note 57 at 678-79. At about 4 
a.m. on March 30, 1991, William Kennedy Smith allegedly raped Patty Bowman at the 
Kennedy estate after the two met at a night club in Palm Beach, Florida. See Matoesian, 
supra note 57, at 670 n.1. The trial took place from late November to early December in 
1991. Seeid. On December 11, 1991, the jury found Smith not guilty ohape. Seeid. 
78 SeeTASUTZ, supra note 56, at 90; Matoesian, supra note 57, at 679. 
'19 See sources cited supra note 78. 
80 SeeTorrey, supra note 52, at 1041; sources cited supra note 78. 
8! See Matoesian, supra note 57, at 670. 
82 SeeTASUTZ, supra note 56, at 82-88; Matoesian, supra note 57, at 671-73. 
430 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 22:419 
changes throughout the legal system.83 Urging courts to treat rape the 
same as other crimes, rape law reforms repealed or modified tradi-
tional rape laws and enacted evidentiary reforms in every state in the 
United States.84 
The most common and widespread changes occurred in four ar-
eas.85 First, rape was redefined so that there was no longer a single 
crime of rape.86 Rather, most states now define rape as "a series of 
graded offenses defined by the presence or absence of aggravating 
conditions. "87 Second, the consent standards were altered to shift the 
focus from the victim's resistance and consent to the amount of force 
and coercion used by the perpetrator.88 Third, the victim was no 
longer required to corroborate her testimony.89 The fourth and per-
haps most important area of change, known as rape shield statutes, 
prevented defense counsel from introducing information about a vic-
tim's prior sexual behavior.9o These statutes were intended to address 
the problem that jurors perceive a victim's prior sexual history to be 
probative of a victim's credibility, moral character, and consent.91 Pro-
ponents of the statutes argued that these perceptions have a prejudi-
cial impact on the jury decision-making process.92 
However, rape reforms have been largely unsuccessful because 
they have not affected the primary mechanisms by which jurors in 
rape trials determine credibility-reliance on rape myths.93 Research 
measuring the before and after implementation effects of statutory 
reform have found that rape reform has not had a powerful impact 
8~ See Matoesian, supra note 57, at 669. 
84 See SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 18, at 17; TAsuTz, supra note 56, at 153; Matoesian, 
supra note 57, at 670. 
85 See SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 18, at 21; TAsuTz, supra note 56, at 153; Matoesian, 
supra note 57, at 670. 
86 See SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 18, at 21. 
87 See id. 
88 See id.; TASUTz, supra note 56, at 153; Matoesian, supra note 57, at 670. 
89 See SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 18, at 21. 
90 See Matoesian, supra note 57, at 670; Torrey, supra note 52, at 1062. 
91 See Torrey, supra note 52, at 1062-63. 
92 See id. 
93 See SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 18, at 173 (stating that rape law reforms have 
placed few constraints on the discretion exercised by adjudicators); TAsuTz, supra note 56, 
at 154-55 (stating that rape law reform has failed largely because it does not address rape 
myths); Matoesian, supra note 57, at 672-73 (stating that the failure of rape law reform can 
be attributed in part to juror reliance on rape myths in their deliberations); Torrey, supra 
note 52, at 1014 (stating that despite rape law reforms, rape myths impede the successful 
prosecution of rape). 
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on the legal system.94 In the first comprehensive study of the effects of 
rape reform, Cassia Spohn and Julie Horney concluded "the ability of 
rape reform legislation to produce instrumental change is limited."95 
Further, rape law reforms do little to check the discretion of adjudica-
tors.96 This is largely because adjudicators are prone to hold and up-
hold misconceptions about rape, rapists, and victims, rendering at-
tempts to transform the law largely ineffective.97 In particular, despite 
elimination of resistance requirements from rape law, most prosecu-
tors believe juries will be unlikely to find a rape occurred without vic-
tim resistance or an explanation as to why there was not resistance.98 
In other words, the utmost resistance standard is so embedded in the 
minds of adjudicators that rape convictions are largely dependent on 
precisely the factors rape reform attempted to eliminate from de lib-
erations.99 As one prosecutor stated, "Old habits and old attitudes die 
hard; we can change the law but we can't necessarily change atti-
tudes."lOO 
Additionally, despite rape shield laws, evidence of a prior sexual 
relationship between the victim and the defendant will most likely be 
admitted, even when evidence concerns a single encounter months 
before the rape,lOl This is particularly discouraging for acquaintance 
rape cases, where consent is typically a defense.102 Moreover, situations 
where evidence is restricted by rape shield laws often serve to motivate 
defense counsel to make inferences in trial talk that increase juror 
94 See SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 18, at 173; Matoesian, supra note 57, at 688-89; 
Torrey, supra note 52, at 1014. 
95 See SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 18, at 5, 173. Spohn and Horney were the first so-
cial scientists to study the impact of rape reform in more than one jurisdiction and among 
the first to examine the impact of rape reform. See id. at 5. They collected data on the out-
come of rape cases, before and after reforms were implemented, and the attitudes of 
criminal justice officials toward reform. See id. Their data consisted of every rape case 
processed over a fifteen year period in six jurisdictions--Detroit, Michigan; Cook County 
(Chicago), Illinois; Philadelphia County (Philadelphia), Pennsylvania; Harris County 
(Houston) Texas; Fulton County (Atlanta), Georgia; and Washington, D.C. See id. at 5,35. 
Because the extent of reforms varied across the United States, Spohn and Horney chose 
three cities known for stronger reforms (Detroit, Chicago, and Philadelphia) and three 
cities with weaker reforms (Houston, Atlanta, and Washington, D.C.). See id. at 35-36. 
96 See SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 18, at 173. 
97 See Matoesian, supra note 57, at 672-73. 
98 See SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 18, at 128-29. 
99 See id. at 159; ESTRICH, supra note 14, at 18-19; Gaines, supra note 53, at 231. 
100 SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 18, at 129. 
101 See id. at 155. 
102 See id. 
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reliance upon rape myths. I03 Consequently, because rape reform ef-
forts do not effectively counter the pervasive and underlying myths 
about rape that inform the ideological framework of utmost resis-
tance they are, in many ways, fruitless. I04 
IV. USING RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME TESTIMONY TO 
COMBAT RAPE MYTHS 
The ABA's Commission on Women in the Profession has 
identified and called for effective education as a means of fighting 
widespread problems of devaluation of victim credibility and stereo-
typical assumptions about gender in the justice system,105 Joined by 
many state commissions, as well as the National Judicial Education 
Program, the Commission called for courts and bar organizations to 
work with gender bias specialists to ensure that every justice system 
has strategies for effective education.loo This education should in-
clude training not just in "bias sensitivity" but also in social, economic, 
and psychological research that should inform decision making on 
gender-related issues. I07 The Commission also called for collaboration 
with other groups, both within and outside the courts, concerned 
with eliminating gender bias,lo8 In this call for a solution, these or-
ganizations implicitly recognize the failure of rape reform to remedy 
the pervasiveness of rape myths in the minds of trial participants and 
prescribe education as the best weapon to combat these problems.109 
Application of Rape Trauma Syndrome testimony can remedy 
these problems. no Expert testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome can 
educate participants in criminal rape trials and provide them with a 
new framework to understand rape, rape victims, and rapists. 11l In this 
way, not only can Rape Trauma Syndrome testimony counter the 
influence of rape myths on jurors, it can also educate attorneys and 
judges.ll2 Rape Trauma Syndrome, an alternative to the ideological 
103 See Matoesian, supra note 57, at 676-77. 
104 SeeTASLITZ, supra note 56, at 154-55; Matoesian, supra note 57, at 672-73. 
105 See RHODE, supra note 53, at 11, 36. 
106 See id. 
107 See id. 
108 See id. 
109 See id. 
llO See Arthur H. Garrison, Rape Trauma Syndrome: A Review of a Behavioral Science Theory 
and its Admissibility in Criminal Trials, 23 AM.]. mAL Anvoc. 591, 646 (2000). 
I1J See id. 
112 SeeTAsLITz, supra note 56, at 132-33; Gaines, supra note 53, at 227; Garrison, supra 
note 110, at 646; Torrey, supra note 52, at 1065. 
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framework of utmost resistance, educates jurors and effectively chal-
lenges rape myths. l13 
A. A Brief History of Rape Trauma Syndrome 
Rape Trauma Syndrome is considered a post-traumatic stress dis-
order consisting of four elements.114 The term Rape Trauma Syn-
drome originates from a 1974 study conducted by Drs. Ann Burgess 
and Lynda Holmstrom.l15 For one year the study followed ninety-two 
women, who initially came to the Boston City Hospital Emergency 
Ward because they were raped)l6 Burgess and Holmstrom interviewed 
the women at the hospital and then later counseled them by phone 
and through home visits, keeping detailed notes of symptoms re-
ported and changes in thoughts, feelings, and behavior.l17 Upon 
analysis of their findings, Burgess and Holmstrom applied the term 
"Rape Trauma Syndrome" to the reactions and coping mechanisms 
that rape victims may use to deal with the aftermath of rape)l8 Rape 
Trauma Syndrome is the "acute phase and long-term reorganization 
process that occurs as a result of ... rape or attempted ... rape. This 
syndrome of behavioral, somatic, and psychological reactions is an 
acute stress reaction to a life-threatening situation. "119 
Id. 
113 See sources cited supra note 112. 
114 See Gaines, supra note 53, at 228. Rape Trauma Syndrome has four stages: 
First, the patient experiences a type of stressor, which causes distress symp-
toms in most people. Second, the patient re-lives the underlying trauma by 
one of several means, including recurrent nightmares and vivid memories of 
the event. Third, the patient avoids stimuli associated with the trauma or 
demonstrates reduced responsiveness. This lessened responsiveness can be 
"indicated by at least three characteristics including feelings of detachment 
from others, the sense of a foreshortened future, and a restricted range of 
(feeling or emotional response)." Last, the patient exhibits "two or more 
[particular] symptoms not present (prior to) the trauma, including sleep dis-
turbance, exaggerated startle response, and hypervigilance." When the first 
element, the stressor, is rape, therapists and counselors diagnose the patient 
with rape trauma syndrome. 
115 See Ann Wolbert Burgess & Lynda Lytle Holmstrom, Rnpe Trauma Syndrome, 131 AM. 
J. PSYCHIATRY 981, 982-84. 
116 See id. 
117 See id. at 982. 
118 See id. at 981. 
119 See id. at 982. 
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According to Burgess and Holmstrom, the rape victim will go 
through the acute phase immediately following the attack.120 The be-
havior exhibited by a rape victim after the attack can vary.121 Some 
women will react in an expressed style, openly showing fear, anger, 
and anxiety, while others will react in a controlled style, appearing 
calm, numb, and subdued.122 Women in the acute phase will also ex-
perience physical reactions, including the actual physical trauma that 
resulted from the attack, muscle tension that could manifest itself in 
tension headaches, fatigue, disturbed sleep patterns, gastrointestinal 
irritability, and genitourinary disturbance.123 Emotional reactions in 
the acute phase generally take the form of shock, fear, humiliation, 
denial, withdrawal, fear of violence and death, and self-blame,124 
Rape Trauma Syndrome has been frequently reviewed and dis-
cussed in both behavioral science and legal literature.125 Behavioral 
science studies have corroborated Burgess and Holmstrom's Rape 
Trauma Syndrome theory,126 Legal studies on the introduction of 
Rape Trauma Syndrome in criminal trials focus on both its utility in 
proving rape, as well as its ability to rehabilitate a victim's credibility 
once it has been attacked by defense counsel.127 An extensive body of 
case law has developed concerning the admissibility of Rape Trauma 
Syndrome.128 Courts have generally held that the therapeutic origin of 
Rape Trauma Syndrome does not render it unreliable for trial pur-
poses,129 In People v. Taylm; the New York Court of Appeals stated that 
the relevant scientific community has generally accepted that rape is a 
highly traumatic event that triggers the onset of certain identifiable 
symptoms in many women.130 
120 See Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 115, at 982. 
m Seeid. 
122 See id. at 982-83. 
125 See id. 
124 See id. at 983. 
125 See Garrison, supra note 110, at 591. 
126 See id.; Massaro, supra note 12, at 427,431. 
127 See Garrison, supra note 110, at 591. 
128 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mamay, 553 N.E.2d 945, 951 (Mass. 1990); People v. Tay-
lor, 552 N.E.2d 131, 136 (N.Y. 1990); Statev. Kinney, 762 A.2d 833, 840, 842-43 (Vt.2oo0). 
129 See cases cited supra note 128. 
ISO See 552 N.E.2d at 134. 
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B. Using Rape Trauma Syndrome to Provide an Alternative 
to the Ideological Frame of Utmost Resistance 
435 
In her book, Ehrlich contends that the outcomes of rape trials 
are influenced by the ideological frame of utmost resistance because 
there are no alternative ideologies challenging adjudicators' reliance 
on rape myths. 131 However, Ehrlich contemplates a solution only when 
she suggests that different questions with different presuppositions 
could challenge the structure of acquaintance rape adjudication pro-
cesses.132 She puts forth a "reasonable woman" standard and suggests 
that, if viewed with the cultural knowledge of women's social and 
physical vulnerability to sexual violence, complainants' inaction and 
deficient signals of consent can be recontextualized as strategic acts of 
resistance and not consensual sex)33 
While this standard certainly would be helpful in eliminating 
gender bias in the judicial system, Ehrlich misses a crucial step that 
could transform the ideological frame of the utmost resistance stan-
dard to the ideological frame of the reasonable woman standard.134 
Expert testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome can bridge this gap by 
giving adjudicators the tools to apply the "reasonable woman" stan-
dard.135 
Rape Trauma Syndrome educates jurors by providing them with a 
set of behaviors that are exhibited by rape victims.136 It explains how 
the rape is manifested in the victim based on a range of factors such 
as the nature of the rape, as well as the victim's personality, life expe-
rience, support system, and relationship to the attacker.137 Thus, it 
gives the jury a context in which to place and understand the persons 
and dynamics involved in a rape.138 Rape Trauma Syndrome evidence 
can include descriptions of how victims can react within hours after a 
rape, why a victim may not report a rape, why a victim may have faulty 
memories before the rape, as well as why a victim might return to the 
same place as the rape incident.139 These descriptions supply adjudi-
cators with an alternative framework to understand rape when con-
UI See EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 67,152. 
132 See id. at 135. 
m See id. at 144. 
134 See RHODE, supra note 53, at 8. 
m See EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 135, 144; Garrison, supra note no, at 649. 
136 See Garrison, supra note no, at 646. 
137 See id. at 632. 
us See id. at 649. 
m See id. at 639. 
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fronted with victims and situations which do not fit into familiar 
myths about rape.l40 
Moreover, without the behavioral descriptions that Rape Trauma 
Syndrome provides, the average lay person is unable to accurately 
gauge victim credibility.l41 One study, reporting that a victim's emo-
tional response immediately after the rape significantly affected her 
perceived credibility, relied on both the expressed and controlled 
type of victim reaction to rape described in the acute phase of Rape 
Trauma Syndrome.l42 The study asked participants to evaluate rape 
victims' credibility by reading written descriptions and viewing video-
tapes of the rape victim's emotional state.l4S The study participants 
found the credible rape victim to be the one who reacted in the emo-
tional, expressed manner rather than the one who reacted in the 
calm, controlled manner.l44 Studies on Rape Trauma Syndrome have 
found that lack of emotional reaction is common behavior during the 
acute phase of Rape Trauma Syndrome.l45 In this study though, when 
participants were presented with two equally accurate styles of victim 
reaction to rape, they found the style that most fit to the familiar rape 
myth, that is, the expressed style, to be the credible one.l46 
Nevertheless, studies have also shown that acceptance of these 
rape myths can be effectively challenged through education about 
rape. l47 In an effort to prove that pornography promotes the accep-
tance of rape myths, one study exposed subjects to pornographic rape 
portrayals.l48 Researchers, concerned that these beliefs would extend 
beyond the research setting, followed the experiment with a "de-
briefing" communication.149 Subjects were given a strong statement 
about the absolute falsehood of rape myths and affirming the true 
140 See Torrey, sufrranote 52, at 1069. 
141 See David McCord, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony Regarding Rape Trauma ~n­
drome in Rape Prosecutions, 26 B.C. L. REv. 1143, 1155 (1985). Studies involving the average 
lay person are highly relevant to juror sentiment because, as Torrey notes, "[t]here is no 
reason to believe that jurors, who are intended to represent a cross-section of the commu-
nity, will have attitudes about women, rape, and rapists different from those held by mem-
bers of society as a whole." Torrey, sufrra note 52, at 1046-47. 
142 See McCord, sUfrranote 141, at 1155. 
145 See id. 
144 Seeid. 
145 See id. 
146 See id. 
147 SeeTorrey, sufrranote 52, at 1067-69. Torrey cites numerous studies conducted by 
Neil Malantuth and James Check. See id. at 1067 n.258 
148 See id. 
149 See id. 
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horror of rape,150 When assessed during the follow up period, the de-
briefed subjects exhibited a lower acceptance of rape myths.151 These 
studies, demonstrating that appropriate debriefing can reduce the 
acceptance of rape myths, open the door for Ehrlich's "reasonable 
woman" standard.152 By providing the study participants with informa-
tion about rape, the researchers were able to challenge their accep-
tance and reliance on rape myths with the cultural knowledge of 
wome.n's social and physical vulnerability to sexual violence.153 
Expert testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome to explain behav-
ioral patterns of rape victims functions in the same way as the de-
briefings that researchers have used,154 Indeed, a growing number of 
courts have allowed introduction of expert testimony about Rape 
Trauma Syndrome when it is used to educate the jury,155 One of the 
most broadly accepted uses of Rape Trauma Syndrome evidence is to 
explain behavioral patterns of rape victims that might be viewed as 
inconsistent with a claim of rape,156 Expert testimony has been used to 
explain the behavior of rape victims as a class, as well as individual vic-
tims.157 Use of testimony describing a victim's behavior during and 
following a rape is typically admitted and utilized in courts.158 Offer-
ing Rape Trauma Syndrome evidence for this purpose legitimizes the 
victim's inconsistent or unusual behavior.159 Further, using Rape 
Trauma Syndrome testimony in this way is not offering it as evidence 
150 See id. 
151 &e Torrey, supra note 52, at 1067-69. A follow-up study by the same researchers, de-
vised specifically to gauge the success of these types of debriefings, yielded similar results. 
See id. at 1068-69. 
152 See EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 144; Torrey, supra note 52, at 1067-69. 
153 See sources cited supra note 152. 
154 See Torrey, supra note 52, at 1067-69. 
155 See, e.g., Mamay, 553 N.E.2d at 951 (allowing expert testimony on rape trauma syn-
drome to explain that not all victims of rape and sexual assault report the event immedi-
ately and to explain that, in the context of a trust relationship, such as a doctor-patient 
relationship, some victims may return to the trusted relationship for further contact with 
the perpetrator of the assault); Taykn, 552 N.E.2d at 136 (allowing expert testimony on 
rape trauma syndrome to explain reaction of complainant in the hours following her at-
tack, and to explain why complainant may have been initially unwilling to report that de-
fendant had been man who attacked her); Kinney, 762 A.2d at 842-43 (allowing expert 
testimony on rape trauma syndrome and characteristics of rape victims to explain why a 
rape victim might not struggle physically or loudly, might fall asleep in her attacker's bed 
after the rape occurred, and might not immediately report the rape). 
156 &e Kinney, 762 A.2d at 842-43. 
157 &eGarrison, supra note llO, at 639. 
158 See cases cited supra note 155. 
159 See Gaines, supra note 53, at 251-52. 
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of the crime, rather, it is educating the jury that victims often behave 
in ways contradictory to the myth of a traditional rape victim.160 
Rape Trauma Syndrome testimony has proven particularly effec-
tive in rehabilitating the victim when the defense asserts that the 
complainant consented to the rape,161 Despite some limitations, a 
number of states have allowed testimony of Rape Trauma Syndrome 
to be admitted where the defendant concedes that sexual intercourse 
occurred, but contends it was consensual.162 These states have held 
that the presence of Rape Trauma Syndrome in a victim can be rele-
vant to whether a rape did take place.163 
Courts have stated that because false rape myths affect common 
understanding, the various patterns of response among rape victims 
are not within the ordinary understanding of the average juror,164 Peo-
ple v. Taylor, one of the leading cases on the use of expert testimony on 
Rape Trauma Syndrome, provides an example of just how foreign the 
behavior of rape victims can be to jurors.165 In that case, the defen-
dant's first trial ended with the jury being unable to reach a verdict. l66 
At trial, evidence was presented that the complainant, though she 
knew her attacker, initially told police that she could not identify her 
attacker and then later identified him to her mother while at the po-
lice station.167 Additionally, defense counsel presented evidence that 
the victim appeared calm after the attack.16S The jury was unable to 
reach a verdict because the complainant'S behavior was not within the 
ordinary understanding of the jury,169 The jury's difficulty in deciding 
the case demonstrates the problem a jury has in associating rape with 
behavior not conforming to common rape myths.170 
160 See id. 
161 See Taylor, 552 N.E.2d at 137. 
162 See, e.g., State v. Marks, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (Kan. 1982) (finding Rape Trauma 
Syndrome evidence relevant when a defendant argues the victim consented to sexual in-
tercourse); Kinney, 762 A.2d at 842 (allowing Rape Trauma Syndrome evidence offered to 
respond to defense claims that the victim's behavior was consensual sex because it was 
inconsistent with rape); State v. McCoy, 366 S.E.2d 731, 737 (W. Va. 1988) (finding that 
where consent is a defense to a rape charge, qualified expert testimony on rape trauma 
syndrome is relevant and admissible) . 
163 See cases cited supra note 162. 
164 See Taylor, 552 N.E.2d at 136; Kinney, 762 A.2d at 842. 
165 See 552 N.E.2d at 136; Garrison, supra note 110, at 644. 
166 See Taylor, 552 N.E.2d at 132. 
167 See id. 
168 See id. 
169 See id. at 132, 136. 
170 See id. 
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However, on retrial, the testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome 
provided the jury with an alternative ideological frame with which to 
view the facts of the case.l71 As a result, the jury returned a verdict of 
one count of attempted rape in the first degree and two counts of 
sodomy.172 In the second trial, expert testimony on Rape Trauma Syn-
drome was presented for two purposes: to explain why the complain-
ant might have been unwilling to name the defendant as her attacker 
and to rebut the inference that because the complainant was quiet 
and controlled following the alleged attack, it could not have been 
rape.173 Here, Rape Trauma Syndrome countered two manifestations 
of the prevalent rape myth that women falsely claim rape after con-
senting to sexual relations: that rape victims immediately report rape 
and that rape victims are extremely agitated after a rape,l74 
By providing jurors with another way in which to view the victim's 
behavior, testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome challenged jurors' 
natural tendency to utilize familiar rape myths,l75 No longer con-
strained to evaluate the victim's behavior under the utmost resistance 
standard, the jury was able to understand why a victim might not be-
have in the manner familiar rape myths prescribe.176 
C. Limitations on the Use of Rape Trauma Syndrome Testimony 
in Criminal Trials 
However, testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome is con trover-
sial.177 Rape Trauma Syndrome lacks the scientific precision to prove 
causation because studies have not been able to demonstrate a 
specific link between particular symptoms and rape: not all victims of 
rape react the same way; some victims of rape do not show signs of 
Rape Trauma Syndrome behavior; and other factors unrelated to the 
rape can also affect psychological and emotional trauma after a 
rape,l78 Furthermore, Burgess and Holmstrom intended their Rape 
Trauma Syndrome theory not to provide prosecutors with a legal 
171 See Taylm; 552 N.E.2d at 132-33. 
172 See id. 
!73 See id. at 132. 
174 See id.; Torrey, supra note 52, at 1025, 1064-65. 
175 See Taylm, 552 N.E. 2d at 136. 
176 See id.; EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 135, 144. 
177 See, e.g., State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982); Taylor, 552 N.E.2d at 
138-39. 
178 See Gaines, supra note 53, at 230; Garrison, supra note 1l0, at 639. 
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analysis to prove rape, but rather to provide a therapeutic tool to aid 
in the diagnosis and treatment of psychiatric patients.179 
Noting these factors, courts have specifically held that when Rape 
Trauma Syndrome is introduced to prove that a rape occurred, it is 
unduly prejudiciaI.l80 In People v. Taylor, the New York Court of Ap-
peals also found expert testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome to be 
prejudicial.l81 The trial court had allowed expert testimony on Rape 
Trauma Syndrome to show that the behavior complainant and her 
grandmother had testified to was consistent with a set of symptoms 
commonly associated with women who had been raped.182 The court 
held this evidence to be prejudicial and admitted in error because it 
clearly implied that, because the complainant exhibited these symp-
toms, a rape occurred.183 
Even the use of the term Rape Trauma Syndrome itself is contro-
versial. l84 Because the term implies that a rape has occurred, many 
jurisdictions find it unduly prejudiciaI.l85 For example, Alaska, Iowa 
and Maryland's state supreme courts have all allowed expert testi-
mony on Rape Trauma Syndrome conditioned on the fact that the 
term Rape Trauma Syndrome not be used.18G However, by restricting 
179 See Gaines, supra note 53, at 229-30. 
ISO See, e.g., Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229 (finding expert witness' testimony that de-
scribed Rape Trauma Syndrome and gave opinion that complainant had been raped was 
"no help to the jury and produces an extreme danger of unfair prejudice"); Taylm; 552 
N.E.2d at 139 (finding trial court erred in permitting the admission of expert testimony 
regarding rape trauma syndrome to prove that a rape occurred because of the presence of 
symptoms of Rape Trauma Syndrome). 
181 See 552 N.E.2d at 138-39. People v. Taylor is two cases consolidated on appeal, Taylor 
and People v. Banks. ld. The court found the use of expert testimony on Rape Trauma Syn-
drome permissible in Taylor, but prejudicial in Banks. ld. 
182 See id. at 133. 
183 See id. at 138-39 
184 See Garrison, supra note 1l0, at 647-48. 
185 See id. 
186 See Hilburn v. State, 765 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (holding tpat tes-
timony tending to establish that complainant's behavior was not inconsistent with a person 
who had undergone trauma was admissible specifically because the expert did not say 
complainant's behavior "was consistent with an Eskimo woman who had been raped," that 
complainant "was suffering from 'rape trauma syndrome,' or that he believed her testi-
mony was truthful"); State v. Gettier, 438 N.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Iowa 1989) (holding that testi-
mony limited to an explanation of the effects of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and the 
typical reaction of a rape victim was admissible because "the expert neither used the term 
'rape trauma syndrome' nor offers an opinion on whether the victim had been raped"); 
State v. Allewalt, 517 A.2d 741, 751 (Md. 1986) (holding that psychiatrist's testimony that 
victim suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder was admissible because "Dr. Spodak 
never used the term 'rape trauma syndrome,' and avoiding that terminology is more than 
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Rape Trauma Syndrome testimony in this way, these courts implicitly 
recognize the value of Rape Trauma Syndrome testimony.lS7 The 
value of this form of testimony is not its use to prove propensity or 
that a rape has occurred. ISS Rather, Rape Trauma Syndrome testi-
mony is valuable because it can open jurors and judges' minds to al-
ternative understandings ofrape.189 
CONCLUSION 
In her book, Representing Rape: Language and Sexual Consent, Susan 
Ehrlich argues that events in rape trials are viewed through the ideo-
logical frame of the utmost resistance standard.190 Her observation of 
this ideological frame is supported by the many false rape myths 
prevalent in society.191 Rape myths pervade the judicial system and the 
minds of many of its participants.192 
While Ehrlich's observation is certainly helpful to a better under-
standing of why rape reform is not working, she proposes no real so-
lutions to the problem.193 More is needed to counter effectively the 
influence of gender bias on adjudicators' decisions. Ehrlich comes 
closest to a solution when she envisions a "reasonable woman" stan-
dard which would allow different questions with alternative presuppo-
sitions to structure acquaintance rape adjudication processes.194 This 
standard, informed by the cultural knowledge of women's social and 
physical vulnerability to sexual violence, would reconceptualize com-
plainants' inaction and deficient signals of consent as strategic acts of 
resistance rather than consensual sex.195 
While the "reasonable woman" standard would be helpful in 
eliminating gender bias in the judicial system, Ehrlich does not pro-
vide a way to attain it.196 Expert testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome 
could replace the ideological frame of utmost resistance with this 
cosmetic. The concern with unfair prejudice is largely reduced when the terminology does 
not equate the syndrome exclusively with rape. ") 
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ideological frame of the "reasonable woman. "197 In allowing Rape 
Trauma Syndrome evidence to provide a context for the events and 
persons involved in rape, participants in rape trials will have the tools 
to apply the "reasonable woman" standard. 198 
The value of Rape Trauma Syndrome testimony resides not in 
proving that a rape occurred, but in educating adjudicators about 
rape and challenging their prejudices.199 Rape Trauma Syndrome tes-
timony could have dispelled dominant rape myths in the case Ehrlich 
examined.20o The influence of rape myths on Matt's criminal trial is 
explicitly represented in the reasoning behind the judge'S decision.201 
Matt was convicted on one count of sexual assault against Marg and 
acquitted on the count involving Connie.202 In finding Matt guilty of 
sexual assault against Marg, the judge cited the corroborating evi-
dence from Marg's friend Melinda and her boyfriend Bob as an im-
portant factor. 203 By relying upon corroboration of the victim's story 
to find rape, the judge decided the case upon one of the factors - cor-
roboration - that rape reform intended to eliminate.204 
The judge acquitted Matt of sexual assault against Connie, and 
stated that the consensual kissing, that occurred before the unwanted 
sexual contact, factored into his decision, "[Y]oung women, in turn, 
must realize that when a young man becomes aroused during sexual 
activity beyond a moderate degree there is a danger that he will be 
driven by hormones rather than conscience. "205 The judge's decision 
reflects the rape myth that once hormones come into play, men are 
unaccountable for the violence they commit. 206 
Rape reform efforts have been successful in some areas, but ad-
judicators are still influenced by rape myths.207 Rape Trauma Syn-
drome evidence can respond to the ABA's call for "effective educa-
tion" to combat the ideological frame of utmost resistance.208 By 
approaching rape reform through education rather than legislation, 
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Rape Trauma Syndrome testimony provides an opportunity to elimi-
nate sexism in the courtroom.209 In this manner, rape reform can 
transcend trial procedure and enter the minds of the decision-makers 
to reach fairer results. 210 
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